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This “ticket of admission” is inspired by reading
Rebecca L. Brown’s ticket, which is called
“Confessions of a Flawed Liberal”. So since this is in
some ways an attempted response, I would like to call
it “Aspirations to Liberal Flawlessness” or just
“Toward Flawlessness.”
The question is whether it is a form of apostasy
from the liberal creed to think (a) that the
Constitution might permit (or indeed require?) the
legal limitation of hate speech, and/or (b) that
federal or state law may constitutionally limit
individual contributions to electoral campaigns in a
significant number of instances. It could be argued
that both propositions represent the abandonment of
basic liberal positions on the importance of the
broadest possible scope for the freedom of speech.
The basic conceptual problem arises from the
tension between two liberal values. What we seem to
confront -- both on the question of hate speech and
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also on the questions of “money as speech” -- is a
clash between two sets of values that most liberals
have always held in the highest esteem: on the one
hand, the values of the freedom of speech and on the
other hand the values of equality.
In the history of the Supreme Court these two
values came to maturity at approximately the same
time. The decision of Brown v. Board of Education in
1954 brought the theme of equality to the forefront of
popular, political and scholarly attention for the
first time in the history of the Supreme Court -notwithstanding earlier partial steps in cases like
Shelley v. Kraemer, Sweatt v. Painter, and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma Board of Regents. (Of course, the Court had
long since turned away from using the equal protection
clause to protect businesses against regulation -- by
asserting, for example, the “equality” of
manufacturers and agriculturalists -- in such cases as
Tigner v. Texas in 1940.1) It is often said that
equality was the principal Leitmotiv of the Warren
Court -- an assessment that owes as much to the
reapportionment cases, such as Baker v. Carr and
1. 310 U.S. 132, overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U.S. 540.
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Reynolds v. Sims, as it does to Brown. But for the
anchoring of equality as a prime liberal achievement
of the Supreme Court, the post-Warren Court
development of gender discrimination jurisprudence -from Reed v. Reed to the VMI case -- is also
essential, and last year’s decision in Lawrence v.
Texas may also eventually take its position in this
role call of the major steps in the liberal
jurisprudence of equality.
It was during the same period -- in New York
Times v. Sullivan in 1964 -- that the Supreme Court
began to accord serious weight to the freedom of
speech as a fundamental constitutional value. This
development was confirmed in 1968 in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, which drew together earlier fundamental
contributions by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Harlan (in
Yates), and Judge Learned Hand. Slightly later cases
like Cohen v. California (Harlan again) and the
Pentagon Papers case (Black, Douglas, Brennan -- but
not Harlan) represented further confirmation of the
central role that freedom of speech had finally
assumed in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
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For liberals, it is an important fact that the
decision of the New York Times case marked a majestic
moment in which the values of speech and the values of
equality coincided and reinforced each other. The same
thing could be said about several other important
cases of the Civil Rights era, such as NAACP v.
Alabama and NAACP v. Button.
The problems we face today, in an attempt to
secure a flawless liberalism, arise because these two
values perhaps most prized by liberals -- speech and
equality -- seem to weigh on separate sides of the
scale in a number of contemporary constitutional
problems. In hate speech legislation, for example, the
desire to achieve equality in society seems to run
contrary to the broadest protection of speech. And in
the context of electoral regulations, the legislative
attempt to avoid gross inequalities through limiting
massive electoral contributions is said to violate a
concept of the freedom of speech that would result in
the most numerous instances of the promulgation of
political opinion.
In an attempt to achieve flawlessness, I tend to
choose the speech side on “hate speech” and the
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equality side on the problems of Buckley v. Valeo. But
actually I think that the equality side on Buckley is,
at bottom, the speech side as well.
With respect to hate speech, I tend to favor full
constitutional protection against criminal
penalization, because it seems to me that this sort of
legislation fosters an atmosphere of suppression which
threatens to go much farther than the suppression of
some particular kind of hate speech that any
particular author of legislation or proponent would
want to suppress. Each of us perhaps has a visceral
sense of what sort of hate speech could be suppressed
without endangering “true” speech values but the
relaxation of speech protections -- if allowed -- will
not be controlled by any particular individual, and
the risks of undue extension of the exceptions are, in
my opinion, unduly great. Moreover, I doubt that the
criminal suppression of hate speech will really make
any significant contribution toward the achievement of
equality. I think, rather, it is more a symbolic
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statement that will fall whimsically upon particularly
annoying individuals.2
Sometimes the more vigorous criminalization of
hate speech in Germany is cited in favor of a similar
approach in the United States. But having closely
observed how some of these rules work in the Federal
Republic of Germany, I am very skeptical about whether
such constitutional doctrines should be adopted here.
First, let me say that I have no doubt that rules of
this kind may be appropriate for Germany -- for
obvious historical reasons -- and in this respect I am
not a “universalist” in constitutionalism. But the
prohibition of hate speech in Germany is also very
closely connected with the view that extreme political
parties, and other forms of “extreme speech” can also
be suppressed. Indeed the German Constitutional Court
did “prohibit” two political parties in the 1950s

2. On the other hand, I think that in relatively closed
communities, like those of universities and schools,
certain forms of hate speech may be subject to some degree
of regulation (without criminal penalties) on the same
grounds that many other forms of speech can be regulated -such as vigorous public tirades against one’s colleagues in
an office setting. The point is that a certain level of
civility is necessary for the functioning of the specific
institution. But I do not think that this argument can be
extended to society in general.
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(including a neo-Nazi party3 and the historic German
Communist Party in the West4), and the government has
tried (as yet without success) to ban a right-wing
party in recent years. It may be said that effectively
the same thing occurred in the United States in the
1950s, in the Dennis case among others. But is this
really the kind of model that we would like to emulate
today?
The German suppression of hate speech is also
very closely connected with a form of constitutional
balancing that I think many American liberals would
find particularly unsettling. It is true that in the
last few years most results in the German
Constitutional Court on freedom of speech have
approximated the results that would have been reached
in the United States also. Yet the technique applied
by the Constitutional Court -- and the doctrine
acknowledged by the Court -- would allow the
penalization of certain political speech that would be
protected here. The current doctrine of the
Constitutional Court would, for example, allow

3. 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952).
4. 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956).
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penalization of certain speech on grounds that come
perilously close to what would be viewed as the
doctrine of seditious libel in the United States. For
example, it appears that, under the current doctrine
of the Court, the statement “all members of the German
army are murderers or potential murderers” -- a
provocative and hyperbolic remark the likes of which
were commonly heard in the United States in the
Vietnam era -- could be subject to criminal
penalization.5
Indeed, as late as the 1970s, the Constitutional
Court upheld prior restraints against a novel by Klaus
Mann (because it supposedly libeled the well-known
actor Gustaf Gründgens, who was both Mann’s former
brother-in-law and a Nazi fellow traveller6). The Court
also upheld a prior restraint against the showing of a
documentary drama about a terrorist attack on a
Germany Army unit, on the grounds that it might

5. See 93 BVerfGE 266 (1995). The German Constitutional
Court also upheld a criminal conviction in the case of a
cartoon that portrayed a famous political figure as a
copulating pig. 75 BVerfGE 369 (1987). The “striking
contrast” with the Falwell case in the United States is
obvious. David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany 206 (1994); see Nolte, 15 EuGRZ 253
(1988).
6. 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) (Mephisto).
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interfere with the rehabilitation of a convicted felon
recently released from jail.7 In 1980, furthermore,
libel damages were upheld in favor of the writer
Heinrich Böll against a TV critic who had issued a
bitter attack against Böll’s writing, on the grounds
that (as Böll claimed) his views were misquoted or
cited out of context.8
Moreover, in more recent German legislation we
can see the perils of such an approach. In a statute,
intended to prohibit denial of the Holocaust, language
was also inserted that was intended to impose
penalties for denial that German-speaking people had
been expelled from Eastern European countries after
the Second World War.9 If we prohibit the denial of the
undeniable, can we be certain that government will
refrain from punishment of other views of history? Do
we really want to fight these battles? Rather, we
should have the degree of confidence in our society
that would allow us to protect -- as Holmes admonished
-- even the thought “that we loathe and believe to be
7. 35 BVerfGE 202 (1973).
8. 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980).
9. See Eric Stein, “History Against Free Speech: The New
German Law Against the ‘Auschwitz’ -- and Other -- Lies,”
85 Mich. L. Rev. 277 (1986).
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fraught with death”. This is the path of free speech,
and I do not think that the prosecution of an
occasional hapless hater -- probably a “puny
anonymity” as was Keegstra in Canada10 -- will actually
move us in any significant way toward the goal of
social justice in a more egalitarian society.
On the other hand with respect to the problems of
Buckley v. Valeo and its successors -- the idea that
money is speech -- I tend to come down on what seems
to be the side of equality. The government ought to be
able to regulate the expenditure of funds in order to
achieve a degree of equality or proportionality in
political power. Here I think the equality principle
of Reynolds v. Sims is important. The government may
not structure the electoral system so that particular
individuals are granted a substantially higher degree
of political power than others. The general principle
is one of equality of each individual within the
electoral system. As Deborah Hellman indicates in her
“ticket”, we certainly would not allow a financially
strapped state to sell more extensive voting rights to
the highest bidder.

10. R.V. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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In the same way, it seems to me that the
government should be allowed to act affirmatively to
preserve this general principle of electoral equality
-- to the extent that it finds it possible to do so -through the regulation of expenditures that might
distort the effective political power that a
particular individual or group may have. Here it might
be said that the values of equality are being
preferred over the values of speech, but I am not sure
that that is really the best way to look at this
result. I would prefer to view limitations on
electoral expenditures -- which, after all, are not
regulations on the content of speech, but rather
regulations of the circumstances of speech -- as more
closely analogous to regulations that might allocate
opportunities to speak in a particular public forum,
or might limit overbearing uses of speech, such as
sound trucks, etc. Because these regulations are
limits on the amount of contributions -- and do not
actually provide support for any particular opinion -I hope that a view of this kind may avoid the
difficulties associated with arguments based on “false
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consciousness” etc.11 In any case, I think that if
equality in voting power is a fundamental aspect of
voting, some degree of equality in effective political
power should also be viewed as an essential component
of the political process -- and therefore of speech -as well.

11. See Charles Fried, “The New First Amendment
Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty,” 59 University of
Chicago Law Review 225 (1992).
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